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	<title>Kryptoblog &#187; FreeBSD</title>
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	<description>Kryptografi och IT-säkerhet på svenska</description>
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		<title>Problem med arc4random i FreeBSD</title>
		<link>http://www.strombergson.com/kryptoblog/2008/12/03/problem-med-arc4random-i-freebsd/</link>
		<comments>http://www.strombergson.com/kryptoblog/2008/12/03/problem-med-arc4random-i-freebsd/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 03 Dec 2008 15:44:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Joachim Strömbergson</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Krypto]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Verktyg]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FreeBSD]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://strombergson.com/kryptoblog/?p=600</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>Enligt en s&#228;kerhetsrapport fr&#229;n FreeBSD-projektet finns det ett problem med slumptalsgeneratorn arc4random.</p>

	<p><img src="http://www.freebsd.org/layout/images/logo-red.png" alt="FreeBSD-logo" /></p>

	<p><a href="http://security.freebsd.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-08:11.arc4random.asc">S&#228;kerhetsrapporten FreeBSD-SA-08.11.arc4random</a> beskriver problemet s&#229; h&#228;r:</p>

	<p><blockquote><br />
I.   Background<br />
arc4random(9) is a generic-purpose random number generator based on the key stream generator of the <span</blockquote>&#8230;</p>


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			<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>Enligt en s&#228;kerhetsrapport fr&#229;n FreeBSD-projektet finns det ett problem med slumptalsgeneratorn arc4random.</p>

	<p><img src="http://www.freebsd.org/layout/images/logo-red.png" alt="FreeBSD-logo" /></p>

	<p><a href="http://security.freebsd.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-08:11.arc4random.asc">S&#228;kerhetsrapporten FreeBSD-SA-08.11.arc4random</a> beskriver problemet s&#229; h&#228;r:</p>

	<p><blockquote><br />
I.   Background<br />
arc4random(9) is a generic-purpose random number generator based on the key stream generator of the <span class="caps">RC4</span> cipher.  It is expected to be cryptographically strong, and used throughout the FreeBSD kernel for a variety of purposes, some of which rely on its cryptographic strength.</p>

	<p>arc4random(9) is periodically reseeded with entropy from the FreeBSD kernel&#8217;s Yarrow random number generator, which gathers entropy from a variety of sources including hardware interrupts.  During the boot process, additional entropy is provided to the Yarrow random number generator from userland, helping to ensure that adequate entropy is present for cryptographic purposes.</p>


	<p>II.  Problem Description<br />
When the arc4random(9) random number generator is initialized, there may be inadequate entropy to meet the needs of kernel systems which rely on arc4random(9); and it may take up to 5 minutes before arc4random(9) is reseeded with secure entropy from the Yarrow random number generator.</p>


	<p><span class="caps">III</span>. Impact<br />
All security-related kernel subsystems that rely on a quality random number generator are subject to a wide range of possible attacks for the 300 seconds after boot or until 64k of random data is consumed.  The list includes:</p>

	<ul>
		<li><span class="caps">GEOM ELI</span> providers with onetime keys.  When a provider is configured in a way so that it gets attached at the same time during boot (e.g. it uses the rc subsystem to initialize) it might be possible for an attacker to recover the encrypted data.</li>
	</ul>

	<ul>
		<li><span class="caps">GEOM</span> shsec providers.  The <span class="caps">GEOM</span> shsec subsytem is used to split a shared secret between two providers so that it can be recovered when both of them are present.  This is done by writing the random sequence to one of providers while appending the result of the random sequence on the other host to the original data.  If the provider was created within the first 300 seconds after booting, it might be possible for an attacker to extract the original data with access to only one of the two providers between which the secret data is split.</li>
	</ul>

	<ul>
		<li>System processes started early after boot may receive predictable IDs.</li>
	</ul>

	<ul>
		<li>The 802.11 network stack uses arc4random(9) to generate initial vectors (IV) for <span class="caps">WEP</span> encryption when operating in client mode and <span class="caps">WEP</span> authentication challenges when operating in hostap mode, which may be insecure.</li>
	</ul>

	<ul>
		<li>The IPv4, IPv6 and <span class="caps">TCP</span>/UDP protocol implementations rely on a quality random number generator to produce unpredictable IP packet identifiers, initial <span class="caps">TCP</span> sequence numbers and outgoing port numbers. During the first 300 seconds after booting, it may be easier for an attacker to execute IP session hijacking, OS fingerprinting, idle scanning, or in some cases <span class="caps">DNS</span> cache poisoning and blind <span class="caps">TCP</span> data injection attacks.</li>
	</ul>

	<ul>
		<li>The kernel <span class="caps">RPC</span> code uses arc4random(9) to retrieve transaction identifiers, which might make <span class="caps">RPC</span> clients vulnerable to hijacking</li>
	</ul>


	<p>IV.  Workaround<br />
No workaround is available for affected systems.</p>

	<p>V.   Solution<br />
<span class="caps">NOTE WELL</span>: Any <span class="caps">GEOM</span> shsec providers which were created or written to<br />
during the first 300 seconds after booting should be re-created after<br />
applying this security update.</p>

	<p>Perform one of the following:<br />
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 6-STABLE, or 7-STABLE, or to the <span class="caps">RELENG</span>_7_0, or <span class="caps">RELENG</span>_6_3 security branch dated after the correction date.</p>

	<p>2) To patch your present system:<br />
The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 6.3 and 7.0 systems.</p>

	<p>a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached <span class="caps">PGP</span> signature using your <span class="caps">PGP</span> utility.</p>

	<p>[FreeBSD 7.x]</p>
	<ol>
		<li>fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-08:11/arc4random.patch</li>
			<li>fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-08:11/arc4random.patch.asc</li>
	</ol>

	<p>[FreeBSD 6.x]</p>
	<ol>
		<li>fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-08:11/arc4random6x.patch</li>
			<li>fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-08:11/arc4random6x.patch.asc</li>
	</ol>

	<p>b) Apply the patch.</p>

	<ol>
		<li>cd /usr/src</li>
			<li>patch < /path/to/patch</li>
	</ol>

	<p>c) Recompile your kernel as described in<br />
<URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the system.<br />
</blockquote></p>



	<p>K&#246;r du FreeBSD, och speciellt om du anv&#228;nder <span class="caps">GEOM</span> och <span class="caps">GBDE</span> b&#246;r du patcha eller uppgradera ditt system (om du inte redan gjort det).</p>
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